The entries below identify the source facts, then separate analytical lessons and proposed tests. They are educational case studies—not findings about any named bank or customer. Open the original document to confirm context before relying on it.
International typology
TBML through inflated trade prices and offshore entities
Primary source: FATF, Trade-Based Money Laundering (2006), Case Study 12, printed report page 7.
Documented facts: The report describes a Brazilian company engaged in illegal activities. Proceeds were moved through cash couriers and offshore accounts; offshore shell companies then bought concentrated syrup from the Brazilian company at highly inflated prices and resold it at a significant loss. FATF describes the scheme as a way for criminal proceeds to return to the Brazilian company through apparently legitimate trade.
Risk analysis: The trade payment alone may appear commercially plausible. The risk emerges when price, counterparty relationships, source of funds, shipping evidence and onward resale are assessed together.
Potential red flags to test:
- Material price variance without a documented commercial explanation.
- Related or opaque offshore counterparties and shell-company indicators.
- Inconsistent invoice, goods, shipping and payment information.
- Unusual loss-making resale or transaction economics that lack a credible rationale.
Control-testing procedure: Select a risk-based sample of trade-finance transactions; reconcile invoice, contract, customs/shipping evidence and payment; document price-benchmark source and variance; review beneficial ownership and counterparties; inspect alert rationale, escalation and disposition. Do not treat any single red flag as proof of crime.
RegTech mapping: TradeGuard for structured trade-document review; ICMS Toolkit for control ownership and evidence; Explainable AI for explainable alerts and human review.
Learning pathway · Price verification with TradeGuardUse this case to practise a structured price-reasonableness review in
TradeGuard ↗. Compare the declared unit price with a defensible reference for the same or a genuinely comparable product, grade/specification, quantity, trade term, currency, date and market. Record the benchmark source, adjustments, variance and rationale; then cross-check the invoice against contract, goods description, quantity, shipping/customs evidence and payment. A price difference is a risk indicator—not proof of TBML. TradeGuard is a review-support tool, not a live market-price database or a substitute for independent evidence.
Try it yourself: Write down (1) the exact price comparison basis, (2) what makes the benchmark comparable, (3) what evidence is missing, and (4) what would trigger escalation. Do not upload confidential customer or bank data.
Open original FATF report (PDF) ↗ · FATF publication page ↗
Evidence status: Source facts verified from the FATF report summary. Local legal applicability and current control requirements must be separately verified.
Bangladesh regulatory baseline
TBML control implementation: from guidance to auditable evidence
Primary sources: BFIU Circular No. 24, dated 10 December 2019, Guidelines for Prevention of Trade Based Money Laundering; BFIU Annual Report 2019–20, printed page 19; BFIU Circular Letter No. 01/2021, dated 7 March 2021, extending the implementation deadline.
Documented facts: BFIU issued the TBML guidelines for scheduled banks. The 2019–20 annual report states that banks had reported few suspicious TBML transactions and identifies limited awareness, guidance and implementation framework as contributing issues. The 2021 circular letter extended the implementation timeline; it is historical evidence of a deadline extension, not proof of the present compliance status of any bank.
Analysis: Issuing a guideline does not by itself demonstrate that a bank implemented it. Auditability depends on approved procedures, ownership, staff capability, transaction-level evidence and testing of actual operation.
Control-testing procedure:
- Obtain the currently applicable BFIU instructions and the bank's approved TBML policy; verify amendments and applicability before concluding.
- Inspect risk assessment, business coverage, customer/product/geography risk factors and approval records.
- Trace selected trade transactions from customer and invoice review through payment, alert handling, escalation and documented disposition.
- Inspect staff training, monitoring-rule governance, exception handling and independent testing evidence.
- Rate gaps by impact and likelihood; assign an owner, due date, evidence requirement and retest criteria.
RegTech mapping: Policy Gap Analyzer ↗ for policy-to-control mapping; ICMS Toolkit ↗ for evidence and remediation tracking; TradeGuard ↗ for transaction-level review.
Learning pathway · Turn a circular into auditable controlsOpen the original BFIU circular and identify the exact requirement, applicability, responsible function and required evidence before mapping it in the
Policy Gap Analyzer. Then use the
ICMS Toolkit to structure control ownership, testing results, issue severity, remediation owner, due date and retest evidence. Confirm later amendments and institution-specific instructions first; do not infer that a historical deadline or report describes today's compliance status.
Try it yourself: Create one control record with fields for source clause, control objective, sample selected, evidence inspected, exception, risk rating, action owner and retest result. Use only non-sensitive or synthetic text.
BFIU Circular No. 24 (PDF) ↗ · BFIU Annual Report 2019–20 (PDF) ↗ · BFIU Circular Letter No. 01/2021 (PDF) ↗
Evidence status: The historical statements above are attributed to BFIU's cited publications. This is not a claim that all banks currently have these gaps, nor a legal opinion on current requirements.
Practice scenario · Monitoring controls
Transaction monitoring: can the institution prove its alerts work?
Primary source: BFIU Circular Letter No. 02, dated 5 February 2026, on scheduled banks' transaction-monitoring systems, and Circular Letter No. 03 of the same date on MFS providers. Check the official circular-letter register for later changes before treating either as current.
Scenario status: This is a hypothetical control-testing exercise, not a reported enforcement case or allegation against an institution.
Test objective: Determine whether monitoring coverage is risk-based, alerts are reproducible, investigations are documented and reporting decisions are supported by evidence.
Control-testing procedure:
- Obtain the approved monitoring inventory, scenario logic, thresholds, change approvals and coverage rationale.
- Use controlled test transactions or an approved test environment to check expected alert generation and suppression.
- Trace a sample of alerts through triage, investigation, escalation, closure rationale and applicable reporting decision.
- Check access controls, audit logs, data quality, tuning approvals, false-positive/false-negative analysis and periodic validation.
- Verify the currently effective reporting rules independently; do not infer reporting obligations from an alert alone.
RegTech mapping: ICMS Toolkit ↗ for control governance and evidence; Explainable AI ↗ for traceable rationale; Policy Gap Analyzer ↗ for mapping verified requirements to procedures.
Learning pathway · Test the whole alert lifecycleUse the
ICMS Toolkit to map the monitoring control from data input and scenario logic to alert triage, investigation, escalation, reporting decision and closure. For an AI-supported alert, review the explanation and evidence trail in the
Explainable AI controls section. Test scenarios only in an authorised test environment; do not run test transactions against live banking systems or use real customer data in public tools.
Try it yourself: Prepare a sample-based audit worksheet: expected alert, actual outcome, threshold/version, reviewer, evidence link, disposition rationale, escalation timing, exception and retest result. A generated alert or missed alert does not independently establish criminal conduct.
BFIU official circular-letter register ↗
Evidence status: The circular-letter titles and dates are listed by BFIU. Scenario steps are proposed audit procedures, not text quoted from the circulars. Confirm later amendments, including any cancellation notices, before use.